On the weak axiom of revealed preference without demand continuity assumptions by JOHN, Reinhard
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
E U I  W O R K I N G  P A P E R  N°84/116
ON THE WEAK AXIOM OF REVEALED PREFERENCE 
WITHOUT DEMAND CONTINUITY ASSUMPTIONS
by
Reinhard JOHN*
♦University of Bonn, Sonderforschungesbereich 21.
I wish to thank Karl-Josef Koch for 
many helpful discussions. Part of 
this work has been done while I was 
visiting the European University 
Institute in Florence, Italy. 
Financial support from this institu­
tion is gratefully acknowledged.




























































































No part of this paper may be 
reproduced in any form without 
permission of the author .
(C) Reinhard JOHN 
Printed in Italy in October 1984 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 





























































































Abstract: We consider two versions of the weak axiom of 
revealed preference for demand functions which are not necess 
arily continuous, and study their relationship to preference 
maximizing behavior. In particular, we characterize demand 
functions satisfying these axioms and obtain some results con 




























































































’ • ■ / f x
■ • ' *





























































































Recently the weak axiom of revealed preference has proved 
to be of some importance to the theory of aggregate demand. For 
it was shown by W.Hildenbrand (1983) that under some assumptions 
on the income distribution of a group of consumers the market 
demand satisfies the weak axiom if all individual demand func­
tions have this property. In a first version of his paper he 
raised the question whether there is a representative consumer 




























































































aggregate demand function can be derived.
Of course, this relation cannot be assumed to be transitive 
for it has been shown by J.Lenninghaus (1984) that in general 
such a market demand function does not satisfy the strong 
axiom of revealed preference. Therefore Hildenbrand1s question 
is related to a conjecture of R.Kihlstrom, A.Mas-Colell,
H.Sonnenschein, and W.Shafer (1976), which claims the existence 
of a representing nontransitive consumer in the sense of 
W.Shafer (1974) for continuous demand functions satisfying 
the axiom. For the special case in Hildenbrand's paper W.Shafer 
has given an essentially positive answer.
Our concern here is the "noncontinuous" nontransitive con­
sumer, i.e. the purpose of this paper is to study the relation­
ship between preference maximizing behavior and demand functions 
which satisfy the weak axiom but are not necessarily continuous.
We examine two versions of this axiom. The first one which 
we shall call the "weak axiom" seems to be the weakest form 
known from the literature. The second one is Samuelson's notion 
and, like in Hildenbrand (1983), denoted as "axiom".
After having given the basic definitions in the next section, 
we shall study the weak version in Section 3. Although we are 
primarily interested in demand functions it turns out that in 
this case we can generalize the results to demand correspondences 
at no additional cost. Roughly speaking, we can characterize de­
mand functions (resp. correspondences) satisfying the weak axiom 
as selections of a demand correspondence which is derived from 
a preference relation with nice properties. By "nice" we mean 





























































































guarantee that nonempty, compact, and convex sets have best 
elements. In particular, they should imply the existence of 
a derived demand correspondence defined for all budget sets.
In the context of the weak version without continuity, this 
seems to be a natural requirement in accordance with the idea 
which is behind Shafer's definition of a nontransitive con­
sumer.
The axiom of revealed preference will be considered in 
Section 4. Since this notion implies unique demand, a "nice" 
preference relation in that case should additionally ensure 
the uniqueness of best elements in convex sets.The first the­
orem in this section characterizes demand functions satisfying 
the axiom as derived from preferences which do not have the 
required properties. But a second theorem shows that some 
further assumptions on the demand function imply that it can 
be derived from such a nice preference at least on its range.
Finally, the paper is finished by some concluding remarks 
in Section 5.
2. Definitions
lLet ]R+ be the nonnegative orthant of the ^-dimensional
Euclidean space 1R and define P={x€ 3R̂  | 0<<x) . For each
0p€P, B(p)={x€ JR^|px<1} is the budget set with respect to the 
vector p of price-income ratios.
A de.ma.nd function [ correspondence) assigns to each budget 
set an element (a subset) of it, i.e. it is a function (corres





























































































lpondence) f:P-*-]R+ such that 
pf(p)<1 for all p€P.^
A demand function f satisfies the weak axiom (0|$ Aevealed 
pAefieAence) iff for all p,q6P 
pf(q)<1 implies qf(p)>1.
f satisfies the axiom (ofi Aevealed pAefieAence) iff for 
all p,q£P
pf(q)^1 and qf(p)<1 implies f(p)=f(q).
Observe that the weak axiom implies the budget identity 
pf(p)=1 for all p. Therefore it does not follow from the 
axiom if this identity is not assumed.
A demand correspondence f satisfies the (weak) axiom iff 
each selection of f has this property. Of course, the validity 
of the axiom implies single-valued demand, i.e. f can be con­
sidered as a function.
tNow let X be a subset of 3R+.
A binary relation R defined on X is called a pAe.fieAe.nce. 
(Aelatlon) on X. If (x,y)€R we call x as least as good 
as y and denote it equivalently by xRy or x£R(y).
A preference relation R on X is called 
uppeA continuous, iff R(x) is closed in X, 
convex, iff R(x) is convex, 
weakly monotone, iff x<<y implies x^R(y), 
monotone, iff x<y implies x£R(y), 
complete, iff x£R(y) or y£R(x),
antisymmetAlc, iff x€R(y) and y£R(x) implies x=y, 
asymmetAlc, iff x£R(y) implies y£R(x),
where each condition holds for all x,y€X. 2




























































































Let R be a preference relation on X.
If YEX then y€Y is an R-be.it element In Y iff 
y£R(x) for all x€Y.
If p£P then fR (p) denotes the set of all R-best elements 
in BX (p):={x€X|px<1}.
A demand function (correspondence) f is called derived.
15-iom R on X, if (f(p)}=fR (p) (f(p)=fR (p)), and weakly 
derived, if f(p)efR (p) (f (p)£ fR (p) )# for all p€P.
The revealed preference relation V of a demand correspon­
dence (function) f is defined by
xVy iff there is p£P such that x€f(p) and pys1.
3. Demand correspondences satisfying the weak axiom
In this section we shall characterize demand correspondences 
(and, therefore, demand functions) satisfying the weak axiom 
as weakly derived from preference relations with certain prop­
erties.
A fundamental step towards this goal is provided by the 
following result of H.Sonnenschein (1971).
tLemma 1; Let R be a relation on X cjr with the following 
properties:
(i) R is upper continuous.
(ii) conv F E U R(x) for all finite subsets F of X.^
x£F
Then every nonempty, compact, and convex subset of X has an 
R-best element. 3




























































































Proof: For the sake of completeness we repeat the main
argument of H.Sonnenschein (1971).
Let C be a nonempty, compact, and convex subet of X.
Consider the collection {R(x)nc|x€C} of subsets of C, which
is nonempty because C is nonempty. Since R(x) is closed,
oevery set R(x)OC is compact and therefore closed in 1R .
Take any finite collection (R(xi)f1C)^_1 and any subset
F £  {x.,. . . ,x } . Since C is convex, conv F 5 U R(x)flC
x€F
= U (R(x)nc). By a corrollary to the Knaster-Kuratowski- x€F
Mazurkiewicz Lemma (see Sonnenschein (1971), Corollary 5) it
n
follows that fl (R(x. )nc) ^ 0. Therefore, {R(x)nc|x€C} has 
i=1 1
the finite intersection property which implies n R(x)nC/0.
x€C
Q.E. D.
The next result gives a sufficient condition for a preference 
relation having a derived demand correspondence which satisfies 
the weak axiom.
/Proposition 1: If R is a relation on 3R+ such that for 
all x,y6 3R̂
x<<y implies x 0conv R(y),
then any demand correspondence weakly derived from R satisfies 
the weak axiom.
Proof: For p,q€P let x€fR (p), yefR (q), and py<1. As­
sume that qx<1. Since px^1 and py^1, we obtain 
p(ax+(1-a)y)<1 and q(ax+(1-a)<1 for 0<a<1. It follows the 
existence of z£B(p)nB(q) such that ax+(1-a)y«z. Since 






























































































In the sequel, we will prove the converse of this propostion. 
For that we need the following
Lemma 2; Let f be a demand correspondence which satisfies
the weak axiom. If p^,...,pn£P, then
n
conv( p. ,--,p ) £  U S(p,),, n i=1
where S (p^ : = {q€ | qf (p±) >1 }
n
Proof: Let p 6 conv (p, ,. . . ,p_ ) , i.e. p= I a^p. , a.>0,
n 1 n i=1 1 1 1
a,=1. Assume that p£ U S(p.), i.e. for each i there is
i—1 1
xiGf(pi) with pxi<1. This implies the existence of q>>p
such that c3xi<1 for all i. Since f ' satisfies the weak
axiom, we get pif(q) > 1 for all i. Take any y£f(q). Then 
n
1< £ ctHPHy=py<qy which contradicts qf(q)s1 i=1 1 n
Therefore p€ U S(p.).
i=1 Q.E.D.
Using this result we can show that for a demand correspon­
dence satisfying the weak axiom each set of elements revealed
lpreferred to x€ 1R+ can be separated from x by a hyperplane 
with positive normal vector. Since this is trivial for x£P, 
we state this result as follows:
Proposition 2: Let f be a demand correspondence satisfying
lthe weak axiom. Then for each x6P there exists s£ ]R+ such that
(a) sx^1
(b) sf(p)>1 for each p6P with px<1.
/Proof: Define a relation S on 3R+ by S(p)=
0{q€ IR̂  | p£P ■* qf (p) >1} . If x€P, then any S-best element s in 
B(x) has the properties (a) and (b): sGB(x) implies sxs1





























































































Since for any x€P the set B(x) is nonempty, compact, 
and convex, we can prove the proposition by applying Lemma 1 
to the relation S, i.e. it remains to show the properties (i) 
and (ii) in Lemma 1 for S.
By definition of S, it is obvious that S(p) is closed 
for all p.
pNow let F be any finite subset of 1R+. If there is q£F^P
pthen U S (p)^S (q) = IR, and we have conv F£ U S(p). Otherwise 
p€F p£F
F c p  and we obtain this inclusion by direct application of
Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
A straightforward consequence of Propositions 1 and 2 is a 
characterization of demand correspondences satisfying the weak 
axiom.
Theorem 1: Let f be a demand correspondence. Then the 
following conditions are equivalent:
(1) f satisfies the weak axiom.
(2) The revealed preference relation V has the property:
Py<<x implies y £ conv V(x) for all x,y€ IR+.
(3) f is weakly derived from a convex and weakly monotone
ppreference relation on 3R+.
Proof: (1) ■* (2): If y<<x then x€P and, by Proposition 2,
pthere is s£ 3Rj~ such that sxs1 and sV(x)=s U f(p) &1. This
px<; 1
implies sy<1 and sconv V(x)s1, i.e. y £ conv V(x).
(2) ■» (1): Define a relation R on 3R̂  by R(x)=conv V(x).
R is convex by definition; (2) states that R is weakly mono
tone, and VÇR trivially implies that f is weakly derived from R.




























































































A weak point of the theorem is the fact that in general 
the preference relations in the characterizing class do not 
have nice properties. A convex and weakly monotone relation 
does not ensure the existence of a derived demand correspondence. 
One would like to characterize demand correspondences satisfying 
the weak axiom by a class of preferences which guarantee that at 
least any nonempty, compact and convex set has best elements.
The next result shows that this is possible. Moreover, by 
applying a duality argument to Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 we can 
derive the demand correspondences from preferences R where 
the sets R(x) are closed convex cones with vertex x which do 
not contain any y<<x.
Theorem 2: If f is a demand correspondence satisfying the 
weak axiom, then f is weakly derived from a preference relation
on with the following properties:
1) R is upper continuous and convex.
2) R is weakly monotone.
3) conv F £ U R(x) for , x£F
pany finite F£1R+.
4) R is complete.
pMore specifically, R can be chosen such that for x€ 1R+ 
R(x)={y£ IR̂  | x€P=*s (x) y>1 } ,
where s(x) is a (dual) demand correspondence which satisfies 
the weak axiom.
Proof; If f is weakly derived from a relation R which is
Pdefined by a correspondence s as stated above, then s:P->!IR+ 
must have the property that x£B(p)HP implies f(p) 5R(x), i.e. 




























































































sf(p)>1 holds for each p£P with px^1. Therefore it is 
necessary to define s(x) to be a subset of all s which 
satisfy conditions (a) and (b) of Proposition 2.
We choose for s any such correspondence whose existence 
is guaranteed by Proposition 2.
Since s is a (dual) demand correspondence which is weakly 
derived from the relation S defined in the proof of that 
proposition, s satisfies the weak axiom by (the dual of) Prop­
osition 1 if we can show that q<<p implies q £ conv S(p) for 
all p,q€ 3R+.
Observe first that S(p) is convex by definition. If q<<p 
then p€P and for any x6f(p) we obtain 1=px>qx, i.e. q£S(p).
We have proved that s is a demand correspondence satisfying 
the weak axiom and that f is weakly derived from R defined
Dby R (x) ={y£ | x€P=»s (x) y>1}. It remains to verify the properties
1) to 4).
1) follows immediately from the definition of R. To prove 2), 
let y«x. This implies x£P and 1=sx>sy for any s€s(x), i.e. 
y£R(x).
INow let F be any finite subset of IR+. If there is yeF^P
we get conv FÇR(y)= U R(x). If F ç p  we obtain 3) by applica-
x€F
tion of Lemma 2 to the correspondence s.
Finally, the completeness of R is an immediate consequence 
of the weak axiom for the correspondence s. Q.E.D.
We remark that the largest weakly monotone relation M (de­
fined by x£M(y) iff x<<y) has all the properties mentioned 
in Theorem 2 except for convexity. Since any demand function 



























































































-  11 -
weak version should not be interpreted as a property of con­
sistent behavior but as a consequence of rationality described 
by convex preferences.
4. Demand functions satisfying the axiom *12345
The first result of this section characterizes demand functions 
which satisfy the axiom of revealed preference. Its proof is 
straightforward and the main argument can already be found in 
the work of M.K.Richter (1966,1971).
Theorem 3: Let f be a demand function. Then the following 
conditions are equivalent:
(1) f satisfies the axiom.
(2) The revealed preference relation V is antisymmetric.
/(3) f is weakly derived from an antisymmetric relation on 3R+.
/(4) f is derived from an antisymmetric relation on 3R+.
t(5) There is an asymmetric relation Q on 3R+ which ra-
ltionalizes f in the sense that for all p€P, x€ 3R+ :
(i) xQf(p) implies px>1 .
(ii) px£l and x^f(p) implies f(p)Qx.
Proof: (1) ** (2): xVy and yVx imply the existence of
p,q6P such that x=f(p), y=f(q), py<1, and qx<1. From the 
weak axiom it follows f(p)=f(q), i.e. x=y.
(2) (3): Since f(p)Vx for all x€B(p), f is weakly 
derived from V.





























































































R-best element in any set. Since f is weakly derived from R, 
f(p) is an R-best element in B(p). Therefore it is the only 
one, i.e. f is derived from R.
(4) ■* (5): Define xGQ(y) iff x€R(y) and y£R(x). Q is 
asymmetric since x£Q(y) implies y£R(x), i.e. ygQ(x).
To prove (i), assume x€Q(f(p)). By definition of Q, f(p)gR(x) 
Since f is derived from R, f(p)£R(y) for yGB(p). Therefore 
xf?B (p) , i.e. px>1 .
To prove (ii), assume px<1 and x^f(p). Since f is derived 
from R, f(p)£R(x). Antisymmetry of R implies x£R(f(p)). By 
definition of Q, we get f(p)€Q(x).
(5) «* (1): Let Q be a relation satisfying (i) and (ii) and
assume pf(q)<1 and qf(p)<1. (i) implies f (q) £Q (f (p) ) . By
(ii), it follows f(p)=f(q). Q.E.D.
This characterization theorem is not fully satisfactory for 
the criticism of Theorem 1 applies here too: An antisymmetric 
relation does not guarantee the existence of a derived demand 
function. Of course, if we would have a demand function f such 
that the budget identity pf(p)=1 holds for each p€P then 
the axiom implies the weak axiom and we could apply Theorem 2.
But that would not ensure unique best elements in each budget 
set which in this case would be desirable.
Even if the smallest relation R within the class described 
in Theorem 2 is chosen, the following example shows that in 
general demand functions different from f can be derived from 
R (this would be the case even if R is restricted to the 































































































Consider the demand function f :P JR2+
f (P1fP2)
0)




The axiom can be easily verified and the smallest relation of
the form described in Theorem 2 is given by
y£R(x) iff x€P, sx<1<sV(x) implies sy>1.
Straightforward checking (Fig.1) shows that for x=(x1,x2) with
2CKx.jd and x2>0 there is only one s CJR+ satisfying the in­
equality sx<1<sV(x). It is normal to the straight line through 
x and (1,0), i.e. s=(1 , (1-x1)/x2).
If p is chosen such that p̂  = 1, then no point on the budget 
line given by p is below the straight line through (1,0) and 
any x€P with px<1. It follows that all points on the budget 
line are R-best elements in B(p).
Nevertheless there is a positive result. For if the range X 




























































































lation R on X such that each nonempty, compact and convex
subset of X has a unique R-best element.
Theorem 4; Let f be a demand function with convex range X
such that pf(p)=1 for all pGP.
If f satisfies the axiom, then f is derived from a pre­
ference relation R on X with the following properties:
(1) R is upper continuous and convex.
(2) conv F E U R(x) for any finite F£X.
xGF
(3) R is complete.
(4) R is monotone.
(5) x,y€R(z) for all' zG[x,y] implies x=y.
Proof: Observe first that the validity of the budget identity 
implies the weak axiom (pf(q)<1 implies f(q)^f(p) and there­
fore, by the axiom, qf(p)>1).
Define a relation R on X by 
R(x) = {yex|s(x)ys1 },
where s:X+P is a selection of f 1.
Since this relation is not exactly a restric-
otion of a relation on ]R̂  as defined in Theorem 2 (it is dif­
ferent for x£XSP) we cannot get 1) to 3) by direct application 
of this theorem although the arguments of the proof are essen­
tially the same.
1) follows immediately from the definition.
n
To prove 2), let x^,...,xn€X, x= Z aixi' ais0' Ea^=1 and
assume xgRfx^ for all i. This implies s(x^)x<1 and, by
the axiom, s(x)x^>1 for all i. Summing up, we obtain n





























































































identity. Therefore, x€ U R(x.).
i=1 1
If y£R(x) then s(x)y<1. The axiom implies s(y)x>1, i.e. 
x€R(y). By definition, this means that R is complete.
To prove 4), let x,y€X such that y<x. s(x)CP implies 
s (x) y<s (x) x=1 , i.e. ygR(x) .
Assume now x,y€R(z) for all zG[x,y] and x^y. Choose 
two points x',y'e]x,y[ such that x'^y'. Since x€R(x') and 
y€R(x')f it follows s(x')x>1 and s(x')y>1. But x'€]x,y[ 
and s(x')x'=1 implies s(x')x=s(x')y=1, i.e. s(x')[x,y]=1 
and therefore s(x')y'=1.
By the same argument we obtain s(y')x'=1. The axiom implies 
x 1=y' which contradicts the assumption x'^y', i.e. we have 
proved 5).
It remains to show that f is derived from R on X, i.e.
that f(p) is the unique R-best element in B (p) for each p.
If x€X such that px<1 and s(x)f(p)<1, the axiom implies
Xx=f(p), i.e. s(x)f(p)=1. Therefore s(x)f(p)s1 for all x€B (p),
Xi.e. f(p) is an R-best element in B (p).
It follows from 5) that f(p) is the unique R-best element 
in BX (p). Q.E.D.
This theorem corresponds to an analogous result for demand 
functions satisfying the strong axiom of revealed preference 
which is stated as Theorem 1 in L.Hurwicz and M.K.Richter (1971), 





























































































While the examination of the weak axiom in Section 3 has led to 
a satisfactory characterization we cannot claim the same for 
the results of Section 4. Theorem 3 characterizes demand func­
tions satisfying the axiom essentially by properties of the re­
vealed preference relation which is too small to meet the de­
sired requirements discussed above. To put it differently, this 
theorem is almost a reformulation of the definition.
On the other hand, the weakness of Theorem 4 is that it only 
proves the existence of a nice representing preference relation
lon a subset of ]R+. Moreover we need a convexity assumption on 
the range of the demand function.
Nevertheless, the result is related to the conjecture of 
Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell, Sonnenschein, and Shafer (1976). This 
conjecture claims that continuous demand functions satisfying 
the axiom can be represented by a nontransitive consumer in the
sense of Shafer (1974), i.e. they are derived from a complete,
acontinuous and strongly convex preference on 1R+.
By Theorem 4, we have almost shown the corresponding state­
ment for the noncontinuous case if the demand function is sur­
jective. The representing preference is complete, upper continu­
ous and has some properties comparable to strong convexity (of 
course, it cannot be continuous since this would imply continu­
ous demand which we do not assume).
In other words, if a demand function with convex range X 
satisfies the axiom, it can be represented by some kind of a 




























































































Modifications of the example given in the previous section 
indicate that one cannot hope to get much better results without
assuming continuity. But avoiding the convexity assumption and
9obtaining a representing preference on the whole set IR+ seems 
to be possible for the continuous case which we shall examine 
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